tournament in the world; the 1995 Women's World Cup was broadcast to millions of fans in 67 nations.

Our country's previous participation in this event has displayed to the world the abilities and dedication of our gifted female athletes. The U.S. National Team won the inaugural title in 1991, and finished third in last year's event before sold-out crowds. We now have the opportunity to afford the American people the chance to see their athletes represent them in person at the highest level.

In order for the U.S. Soccer Federation to successfully submit a bid to the Federation Internationale de Football Association, it must show that it has the support of our Government. In 1987, a similar resolution was passed to demonstrate support for the U.S. bid to host the 1994 World Cup. Additionally, the White House has already pledged its support for the event and will designate a senior administrative official to be its representative to the Women's World Cup.

This is an exciting time of growth for women's athletics and U.S. soccer. By supporting the U.S. Soccer Federation's bid to host the 1999 Women's World Cup tournament, we can help be a part of this growth and reaffirm our commitment to American athletic excellence and the good will and competitive spirit that these games represent.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentle-woman from the District of Columbia [Ms. NORTON] is recognized for 5 minutes.

[Ms. NORTON addressed the House. Her remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

NCI ELIMINATES MAMMOGRAPHY GUIDELINES

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Towns] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Speaker, in 1989, the National Cancer Institute [NCI] recommended that women age 40 to 49 undergo biennial mammography screening and an annual mammography at age 50. Six years later, without the consensus of any medical or cancer organizations and against the recommendation of its own national advisory board, NCI eliminated its mammography guidelines for women in the 40 to 49 age group.

Last Congress, Mr. Speaker, the Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, which I formerly chaired, found that the elimination of these guidelines was without scientific foundation. In fact, the subcommittee issued a report entitled "Misused Science: The National Cancer Institute's Elimination of Mammography Guidelines for Women in Their Forties." In that report, we recommend that "NCI further research on

American women, in the 40 to 49 age group, to determine the importance of mammography screening.

Fortunately, others have produced new research to demonstrate that both early detection and screening in younger women can be beneficial in combating this disease. Of the 180,000 cases of breast cancer that are diagnosed each year at least two-thirds, if detected early enough, give women the choice of breast-conserving procedure—a lumpectomy, rather than a mastectomy. Moreover, a recent CBS investigative report by Michele Gillen has highlighted the importance of mammography screening in the early detection of breast cancer and the inability of the NCI to explain its abrupt changes to the guidelines in 1993.

Even more troubling is the fact that the Gillen investigation has uncovered that NCI now wants to back away from recommending any mammographies for women age 50 and over.

This kind of callous attitude could lead to insurance companies refusing to cover the cost of mammography screenings. Over 40,000 women will die from this disease in 1996. If you can recommend an appropriate daily allowance for vegetables in the American diet, you should be able to recommend life-saving screenings for American women.

I say to NCI tonight don't eliminate the only tool American women have to protect themselves against breast cancer. Retain the original 1989 guidelines for mammography screenings and selfbreast exams.

THINK TWICE, COMMUNIST CHINA, BEFORE YOU USE FORCE AGAINST TAIWAN

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. HORN] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. HORN. Mr. Speaker, the diplomatic recognition of the government in Beijing in 1979 did not end our relationship with Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 formally reiterated United States support for the people of Taiwan. Since 1979, U.S. relations have grown steadily closer with both the People's Republic and the Republic of China within the framework of "One China, Two Systems." Despite the growing interaction of the United States with both governments, a dark cloud hangs over future peaceful development. This dark cloud is the refusal of the Beijing Government to renounce the use of force against Taiwan.

Beijing still regards Taiwan as a renegade province that is destined to return to the motherland of China—by peaceful means if possible, by force if necessary. If the people of Taiwan freely and fairly choose to reunite with the mainland—which they have not yet done—then that is their business. If the people of Taiwan are forced to reunite with the mainland—or are intimidated into doing so—then that situation will

become the business of the whole world, including the United States of America. The people of Taiwan are friends of the United States, as we are friends with them. We respect the aspirations of the Taiwanese and support them in the pursuit of their dreams.

Increasingly, the people of Taiwan

also seek a role in governing themselves—a dream that will be fully realized on March 23 when they freely elect their own president and national assembly. This free election is the culmination of years of reform in the political process in Taiwan. It is an obvious contradiction to those who say that Asian cultures cannot and do not support widespread democratic reforms. That is the view by many of the autocrats of Asia. Sadly, it is also the view within some Western circles. March 23 will be an historic date in the advance of freedom during this troubled century.

There is no freedom for the 1.1 billion people of mainland China. There is growing economic freedom. But the aging Communist oligarchy that rules the People's Republic of China is out of step with the aspirations of its own dynamic citizenry.

Now, in recent weeks, officials of the government in Beijing have recklessly escalated their rhetoric, threatening the lives of not only the people of Taiwan, but even the United States. In an appalling turn, the veiled threat of nuclear destruction has been leveled against Taiwan and the United States. Apparently, the mainland Chinese believe that the people of the United States, and Congress, will be cowed by their bluster. They are wrong.

Shortly before the invasion of South Korea in June, 1950, it was suggested by the American Secretary of State that the Korean peninsula was outside of direct United States interests. This played a large part in encouraging the leaders of North Korea that the United States would not interfere with their plans to reunify Korea by force. The recently dedicated memorial on the Mall to the thousands of Americans who died to prevent aggression is proof that they were wrong. It would be a tragic mistake for the current leaders in Beijing to make the same mistake that their then allies in North Korea made nearly a half century ago. It is time for the President to clarify a somewhat stealth China policy that could invite disaster for the people of China, Taiwan, and the United States.

The United States supports peace, and will welcome the opportunity to discuss and resolve our current differences with the people of China. The people of the United States have no dispute with the Chinese. We share many of the same interests. We agree on many important issues. It would be foolish to throw away years of careful progress. That progress has led to mutual friendship and mutual respect. That progress should not stop over aggressive moves that threaten peace. Unfortunately, recent actions by the

Government of the People's Republic of China suggest that these hopes are not important to that current government.

This, however, begs an important question: Is this situation important to the Chinese people? Do the people of China support the bellicose statements of their government? We have no way of knowing because, of course, their government has not asked them, and does not care what its own people think. This is why the United States supports Taiwan, and that is a fundamental reality that those in Beijing cannot ignore.

Mr. Speaker, I ask consent to include the House Republican Policy Committee statement concerning "Communist China's Taiwan Invasion Threat."

COMMUNIST CHINA'S TAIWAN INVASION THREAT

On January 30, Communist China's Premier Li Peng emphasized that in trying to absorb Taiwan as "a region of China . . . in the final analysis, we cannot promise to give up the use of force."

This statement is the latest example of the PRC ratcheting up unsubtle threats against Taiwan. In recent weeks, Chinese Communist leaders told American visitors that the PRC was preparing a plan for a sustained attack on Taiwan should it pursue a policy that they deemed too "independent." These threats against Taiwan were coupled with threats of attack on the U.S. should we seek to protect Taiwan—a remarkable slap in the face to the President after three years of the Administration's "engagement" policy, and in a region the Administration has highlighted as its top foreign policy priority.

While a number of observers have been startled by Communist China's most recent provocations, its threats against Taiwan are part of a pattern aggressive behavior in territorial deputes in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, Communist China's economy and military structure have recently undergone enormous changes, including a sustained nine-percent economic growth rate and dramatic—and ominous—transformation of the military's force structure and doctrine. This recent growth and modernization of the Communist Chinese military threatens vital U.S. national security interests in Asia.

A GROWING PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

Trends in People's Liberation Army (PLA) expenditures for foreign military technology over the last decade reveal an emphasis on force projection through air and naval power, with a 2:3:5 ration for the Communist Chinese Army, Navy, and Air Force respectively. In 1992, Admiral Liu Hauqing, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission and the PRC's highest ranking military officer, publicly affirmed that the PLA Air Force and Navy would remain primary recipients of funding for foreign military technology and weapon systems. Recent notable purchases include: 26 Su 27 Soviet fighters from Russia (with an additional 26 under negotiation); 24 Mil Mi 17 helicopters from Soviet Union; 10 I1-76 heavy transport planes from Russia; In-flight refueling technology; 100 Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles and four mobile launchers; Rocket engines and missile guidance technology from Russia; Uranium enrichment technology and nuclear reactors from Russia; Airborne Early Warning (AEW) technology from Israel; Stinger anti-aircraft missiles from the U.S.; 100 Klimov/Sarkisov RD33 jet engines from Russia; Avionics from US for F-8II fighters; Artillery munitions production equipment from the U.S.; Mark 46 MOD 2 anti-submarine torpedoes from U.S.; 50 T-72 tanks from Russia; and 2–4 Kilo-class conventional submarines from Russia.

The PLA has recently given a greater degree of attention to development of combined arms, rapid deployment units, air mobility, and a blue-water naval capability. Doctrinal changes, weapon systems modernization, and imports of advanced foreign weapons systems indicate an interest in increasing the PRC's ability to project power beyond its borders. Similarly, Beijing has announced its plans to develop two 45,000-ton aircraft carriers within the next decade, and the PLA is already capable of conducting military actions in close proximity to China's borders.

The PLA's greater emphasis on force project through the development of naval and air power resulted in substantial changes in budget allocations. The PRC's official defense budget has expanded every year since 1989, for an increases of 141 percent. The annual increase are as follows: 1989, 13%; 1990, 15.5%; 1991, 12%; 1992, 13.8%; 1993, 13.9%; 1994, 20.3%; and 1995, 25%.

Beijing argues that these six years of hikes were offset by 130 percent inflation. Yet the PRC's stated defense budget does not include research and development, military education, and extra-budgetary appropriations, such as the 1992 purchase of 26 Shukhoi-27 fighters from Russia. Modest salaries, free housing, and free medical services represent far lower outlays for pay and benefits for military personnel than in the West; hence, more of the PRC's defense budget goes to hardware.

Assessing the real value of Communist China's defense budget is extraordinarily difficult because of the aforementioned vehicles, unknown levels of civilian production from the PRC's military-industrial complex, and Beijing's reluctance to publish accurate statistics. As a result, comparative analyses of the PRC's defense budget range from \$18 to \$90 billion.

CHINESE COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN DISPUTES WITH TAIWAN AND ELSEWHERE

The recent PLA buildup in land, sea, and air forces and the overall increase in military spending in the last six years are fueling the fears of Communist China's neighbors—especially Taiwan. The buildup aggravates a number of longstanding disputes in Asia involving the PRC. series of overt Communist Chinese provocations have further heightened tensions in the region.

One of Asia's most volatile strategic issues is the relationship between the PRC and Taiwan. Beijing has repeatedly declared its intent to use military force against Taiwan should the latter move toward independence. The PLA regularly holds large-scale combined air and naval exercises in close proximity to Taiwan. The most recent exercises coincided with Taiwan's national legislative elections and were designated to browbeat the Taiwanese electorate and show that Beijing is serious about using force in the event the island chooses an independent course. The PRC fired six nuclear-capable missiles in July 1995 about 100 miles north of Taiwan, shortly after Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's visit to his alma mater, Cornell University

The PRC's belligerence has recently been raised to a new plane. Chinese Communist political and military leaders told former Assistant Secretary of Defense Chas Freeman that the PRC had drafted plans to attack Taiwan with conventional missile strikes for 30 days if President Less refuses to desist in his calls for international recognition. Beijing's threatening statements and actions towards Taiwan are profoundly troubling, at a time when Taiwan prepares to fully enter the worlds family of democ-

racies by holding its first free presidential election in March 1996.

Ownership of the Paracel and Spratly Islands is one of the most contentious territorial issues in Asia. The strategically-located Spratly Islands extend some seven hundred miles south of mainland China and hold oil and natural gas reserves of an estimated 45 billion tons, valued at \$1.5 trillion. The island chains are claimed by seven nations (the PRC, Brunei, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines), with five (all but Brunei and Indonesia) deploying military forces in the area.

In July 1992, Vietnam signed a contract for

In July 1992, Vietnam signed a contract for Spratly Island oil exploration rights with the Mobil Oil Corporation. Exploration was blocked by PLA naval forces. And in February 1995, Communist China was discovered to have established an outpost on Mischief Reef, located in part of the Spratly Islands claimed by the Philippines. In March, the Philippine Navy responded by destroying small structures and concrete markers the PRC had erected on three reefs. Since then, PLA and Philippine warships have provoked each other, and both nations have detained the other's fishing ships in the area.

Communist China has additional territorial disputes with Japan over the Senkaku-Shoto Islands and with India concerning the Himalayan frontier, a dispute that led to armed conflict between India and China in 1962. Moreover, the Communist regime faces separatist movements in the northwestern provinces of Xinjiang, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia and Tibet. The PLA build-up has ominous implications for how the PRC might employ expanded military capabilities both abroad and at home.

U.S. INTERESTS AND CLINTON ADMINISTRATION VACILLATION

The U.S. has an immense economic stake in stability in the Asia-Pacific region, which accounts for more than 36 percent of U.S. international trade. Seventy percent of Asia-Pacific oil transits the South China Sea and the Spratly Island chain. Communist China's bellicose approach to territorial disputes in that region could affect a significant part of American foreign commerce.

The United States has a substantial stake in supporting fledgling and established democracies in Asia, and a special stake in supporting Taiwan. Taiwan is America's sixth largest trading partner, with hard currency reserves of over \$90 billion. Also, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 implies a commitment of U.S. assistance in the event of foreign aggression.

Recently, as a sign of its commitment to Taiwan, the Congress initiated legislation to permit the sale of F-16 aircraft to that nation and to support Li Teng-hui's visit to the U.S. Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration has made its commitment to supporting Taiwan anything but crystal clear. In the event of military attack by the PRC on Taiwan, a senior State Department official was quoted by U.S. News & World Report on October 30, 1995 as saying, Clinton Administration policy is "meant to be ambiguous. . . . You don't really know what would happen until you get there . . . we would not be in a position to react with force. We would not elect to do that I'm sure." Such a posture seems quite unambiguous, and it's small wonder that the Chinese Communist leaders view the Administration's policy as a green light to bully Taiwan—or worse. One Chinese leader told Chas Freeman that the PRC does not fear retribution from the U.S. because American leaders "care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan," which the former Clinton Administration official interpreted as a threat to use nuclear weapons against the U.S. should it defend Taiwan.

Clinton's Taiwan policy is not an isolated case of weakness encouraging the PRC's bellicosity. The Clinton Administration has squandered U.S. credibility through a dizzying series of policy flip-flops and retreats in the region. The most noticeable reversal to the PRC was on most-favored nation (MFN) trade status. Candidate Clinton excoriated President Bush for kowtowing to the PRC's leadership after the Tianenmen massacre of June 1989. In May 1993, Clinton issued an Executive Order formally linking the PRC's MFN status to progress on human rights in Communist China, which he had charged Bush with overlooking. Then, on May 26, 1994-almost exactly one year after the Executive Order—President Clinton tore up the Order, separating MFN trade status from human rights.

Another Asian policy cave-in that did not go unnoticed in the PRC followed the Administration's May 16, 1995 threat to slap 100 percent tariffs on luxury cars exported by Japan to the United States as a result of a Section 301 unfair trade practices case involving sale of autoparts in Japan. On June 28, 1995, the Administration cast aside its threat in a 'compromise'' in which Japan made no commitments to particular numbers of foreign autoparts it had to buy or of dealerships that would sell foreign cars. And yet again Clinton's vow not to allow the North Korean tyranny to retain nuclear weapons was promptly followed by the August 12, 1995 "framework agreement," in which the Administration rewarded Communist North Korea for its nuclear weapons program with aid and reactor technology. Whatever the merits of Clinton's ultimate position, the fact that he was so willing to alter his policies in the face of any resistance has not been lost on the Chinese Communists.

CONCLUSION

Asian nations are concerned because the Chinese Communist leadership has historically shown a willingness to use military force to settle disputes within what it regarded as its sphere of influence. The PLA has seen battle at least 11 times since the inception of the Chinese Communist dictatorship in 1949. China's build-up of naval forces is designed to expand this sphere by enhancing its ability to project force; this program has already spawned a naval arms race among Asian nations. These developments have created mounting regional instability.

Its vast size, population, economy, and air and naval force projection capabilities make Communist China a tremendous regional power. The PRC's growing force-projection capabilities are further destabilizing the Asia-Pacific region. The rising military profile of Communist China in that region—in terms of both capability and aggressive intent-necessitates policies to protect American economic interests and the democracies in the region. And the greatest danger is to the Taiwanese democracy—which the PRC is now threatening to attack or invade. Despite repeated claims that the Asia-Pacific region is its top priority, the Clinton Administration has unwittingly encouraged Communist Chinese imperialism, and has completely failed to promote robust policies to counter these ominous trends.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Guam [Mr. UNDERWOOD] is recognized for 5 minutes.

[Mr. UNDERWOOD addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

MEXICO MUST GET SERIOUS ABOUT STOPPING DRUG TRAF-FICKING

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. MILLER] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, today I am proud to join my colleagues, Senators DIANNE FEINSTEIN and ALPHONSE D'AMATO, by introducing bills to force Mexico to crack down on drug trafficking and money laundering operations as that country has pledged—but failed—to do.

The bills would prohibit the extension next month of United States guarantees for multibillion dollar loans to Mexico, deny applications for entry of Mexican commercial vehicles into the United States under NAFTA, and express the sense of the House that Mexico has not cooperated in antinarcotics efforts, and therefore should not be certified under the Foreign Assistance

All of these measures would remain in effect until Mexico meets specified conditions proving it is taking steps to eradicate drug activities. Senators FEINSTEIN and D'AMATO introduced this legislation this week and I am introducing identical legislation here today. I applaud them for their initiative in this area.

Last year, Congress approved President Clinton's request to guarantee \$20 billion in loans to Mexico following an economic crisis there. The year before that we passed NAFTA, a free-trade agreement that gives Mexico special and unique access to America's markets. And now, next month, President Clinton will likely ask Congress to approve the extension of loan guarantees to Mexico for at least 6 months, and possibly longer.

But the President will be unable in good faith to certify that Mexico has met its obligation to crack down on drug smuggling, money laundering, and government corruption as it has pledged to do.

Mexico is one of the most significant source countries for the transport of narcotic and psyshotropic drugs into the United States. The Drug Enforcement Agency estimates that 75 percent of all cocaine available in the United States travels through Mexico, up to 80 percent of all foreign-grown marijuana in the United States originates in Mexico, and 90 percent of the chemical used to make the drug speed flows through Mexico before infecting our neighborhoods.

But, Mexico is not only shipping drugs to the United States, it is also shipping its drug smugglers. Nearly 90 percent of drug smugglers arrested at the border are Mexican. Mexico is also a major transshipment point for Columbian drugs and drug money. And because it has no reporting requirements for large cash transactions, Mexico has become a haven for drug money laundering.

To make matters worse, Mexico is also preventing the United States from

enforcing our own drug laws. The United States has 165 extradition requests pending with Mexico. And despite our extradition treaty with that country, Mexico has never allowed the extradition of a single Mexican national, even though we are supposed to be close allies. In fact there are reports that leaders of drug cartels, known to the Mexican Government and its police, are frequently seen in public. Apparently they have no reason to be afraid: reports are rampant of widespread government corruption, extending possibly even to higher levels of power.

Time and time again, the United States treats Mexico like a trusted ally and what we get in return is an increase in drugs flowing from Mexico to the United States poisoning our kids and making the American "War on Drugs" ineffectual.

Why should the American taxpayer support Mexico's Government or its economy when Mexico is undermining American antidrug laws? We should not.

We should not extend multibillion-dollar loans to Mexico, provide foreign aid, or allow entry of their commercial vehicles without evidence that Mexico is taking concrete steps to eradicate drug activities. We have too much at stake—in America's schoolyards, workplaces, and homes—to tolerate this level of inaction on such an important issue.

Again, I applaud Senators FEINSTEIN and D'AMATO for their initiative in this area and I encourage all my colleagues to join me in cosponsoring these three pieces of vital legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I submit the following for the RECORD:

SENSE OF THE SENATE RESOLUTION THAT MEXICO SHOULD NOT BE CERTIFIED

Expresses the sense of the Senate that the President should not certify:

(1) Mexican cooperation with international drug enforcement efforts; or

(2) that is it in the vital national interests of the U.S. to give this aid notwithstanding Mexico's noncooperation.

If the President does not make these certifications, the result would be: a 50% reduction in U.S. aid to Mexico; and the United States not supporting the provision of multilateral development bank assistance by various international bodies.

The resolution sets out the basis for this recommendation:

Mexico has failed to prevent or punish money laundering.

The Drug Enforcement Administration estimates that at least 75 percent of all cocaine available in the United States travels through Mexico.

Various U.S. drug enforcement agencies estimate that 70 to 80 percent of all foreigngrown marijuana in the United States originates in Mexico.

According to U.S. Customs Service, 69.5 percent of those arrested for drug smuggling at border stations in the United States are Mexican Nationals.

The Drug Enforcement Administration has stated that drug smugglers have been flying airplanes carrying 10 to 20 tons of cocaine at